ABSTRACT The use of relay can expand the coverage of millimeter-wave (mmWave) signals, whereas it may increase the risk of information leakage due to the additional link from source to relay. In this paper, we consider a secure communication in the mmWave randomize-and-forward relaying system with multiple spatially random eavesdroppers. By leveraging the tools from stochastic geometry, we investigate the reliability/rate performance with security consideration. The closed-form expressions of secure connectivity probability, secrecy outage probability, and the first-order integral expressions of average achievable secrecy rate for both non-colluding and colluding eavesdroppers cases are derived. The simulation results are presented to verify our derivations and show that the secure connectivity probability of relay transmission is larger than direct transmission when the relay locates in an oval-like area and its range is related to the antenna gains of source and relay. Furthermore, the secrecy outage probability and average achievable secrecy rate can also be improved when the relay is closed to the midpoint between the source and the destination.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid development of computer science and electronic devices, various novel applications (e.g., virtual reality, artificial intelligence and ultra-high definition transmission video) have entered our life. In particular, with the popularization of smart devices, wireless data traffic is skyrocketing year after year, which is anticipated to grow 10000 folds within the next 20 years. However, conventional microwave in band below 6GHz cannot meet such bold increase in wireless data volume due to its scarce frequency resource. Hence, it is inevitable to explore the higher frequency band, like millimeter wave (30GHz-300GHz).
Recent researches [1] , [2] show several advantages for using mmWave communication: 1) Large continuous unused bandwidth. Compared to sub-6GHz microwave, there are a large amount of available bandwidth for future mobile networks in mmWave band. Except the infaust bands such as the water vapor absorption band and the oxygen absorption
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Congduan Li. band, the potentially available bandwidth still can be more than 150GHz. 2) Short wavelength. Contrary to conventional microwave signals, the wavelength of mmWave signal is much shorter, which makes it possible to pack a mass of antennas into a compact device. Furthermore, with many antenna elements, the beamwidth can be narrow by using beamforming technology [3] . The positive side of this property is the robustness against unexpected interference, and the higher security against information leakage.
Although mmWave has these advantages, there are some defects constraining its applications. For instance, mmWave signal is very sensitive to blockage and suffers severe pathloss. Relay transmission technology has been identified as an effective strategy that increases the range and reliability of wireless networks [4] , [5] . A relay can be exploited to help the source transpond the signals to the destination if the direct channel suffers severe fading. Thus, using relay technology is a feasible method to overcome the short coverage in mmWave networks.
Due to the broadcast nature of wireless networks, wireless communication is vulnerable to eavesdropping attacks.
At the same time, with the ubiquitousness of wireless connections, a large number of sensitive and secret information (e.g., private photo, financial data and electronic password) has been transmitted via wireless channels. Hence, it is one of the top priorities to achieve secure communication in mmWave relaying networks.
A. RELATED WORK AND MOTIVATION
Relay technology has drawn increasing attention for overcoming high path-loss in mmWave band. Lin et al . [6] analyze and compare the outage performance of amplifyand-forward (AF) and decode-and-forward (DF) relaying scenarios in the presence of multiple co-channel interferences for mmWave communication systems. In [7] , considering a two-hop AF relaying mmWave system, the authors study the maximum achievable rate for half-duplex and full-duplex strategies, and investigate the impacts of the beamwidth and self-interference on maximum achievable rate. In addition, the full-duplex relay can be used to obtain high spectral efficiency, but it will consume much higher energy than halfduplex relay. Recent work [8] examines the energy efficiency in several full-duplex relaying enabled systems, and envisages some energy efficiency oriented research in mmWave relaying networks. Furthermore, [9] and [10] investigate the coverage performance for mmWave relaying system in different relay selection schemes (e.g., random selection scheme and minimum maximum path-loss scheme). However, all these works focus on the reliability/efficiency performance of the mmWave relaying networks without security consideration.
Physical layer security can protect the confidential information from wiretapping by exploiting the randomness of wireless channel [11] , [12] . Recently, [13] investigates the secrecy performance of the noise-limited and artificial-noise assisted mmWave cellular networks. Zhu et al. [14] study the average achievable secrecy rate in mmWave ad hoc networks. In addition, the secrecy outage probability and the average achievable secrecy rate of hybrid mmWave networks have been examined in [15] and [16] . However, these works consider the systems without relay, and the obtained results cannot be applied to mmWave relaying networks directly due to the additional link from the source to relay, which may increase the risk of information leakage. In [17] , considering a mmWave two-way AF multiple input multiple output relaying system where two source nodes exchange information via a relay in the presence of one eavesdropper, and all of the nodes equip multi-antennas. The authors investigate the secrecy beamforming designs and analyze the secrecy sum rate in different parameters. It is worth mentioning that the RF relay mainly used in secure multihop communications is advocated in many researches. For RF strategy, source and relay adopt different codebooks to transmit the same messages [18] . Koyluoglu et al. [19] analyze the achievable secure rate in multi-hop wireless networks, where RF relay is used in every hop to ensure maximal uncertainty at the eavesdropper(s). Cai et al. [20] explore the problem that when the secrecy performance of using RF relay is better than direct transmission in microwave adhoc networks. Moreover, [21] investigates the secrecy outage probability in the typical four nodes model, and find that the RF protocol is always better than DF protocol to enhance secure connection. Shafie et al. [22] propose a significant average secrecy end-to-end throughput improvement relative to the conventional bufferless full-duplex relaying scheme, and the performance in RF protocol is better than DF protocol. Our previous work [23] examines the secure connectivity probability of mmWave relaying networks in non-colluding and colluding eavesdroppers cases under RF strategy. In this paper, we also adopt RF relay, and investigate some still exiting questions. For example, if the secrecy performance of relay transmission can be better than direct transmission in mmWave networks and how can we improve it?
B. CONTRIBUTION
In this paper, we concentrate on the secure communication of mmWave relaying networks in the presence of multiple spatial randomly eavesdroppers. Our contributions are summarized as follows:
• We are the first to analyze the secrecy performance in the mmWave relaying networks with multiple spatial randomly eavesdroppers, which are modeled under a stochastic geometry framework. Different from previous researches about the physical layer security in mmWave networks, we examine the influences of relay on secrecy performance. In addition, different from the existing researches in conventional microwave relaying networks, we consider the characteristics of mmWave channels, and discuss the effect of fan-beam antenna on secrecy performance.
• We investigate the reliability and rate performance of mmWave relaying networks with security consideration. The closed-form expressions of secure connectivity probability, secrecy outage probability and the first order integral expressions of average achievable secrecy rate for the mmWave relaying networks in both the non-colluding and colluding eavesdroppers cases are derived. We use Monte Carlo simulation to verify the derivations and the analytical models can be applied in mmWave relaying system design such as relay deployment.
• The simulation results show that the secure connectivity probability of relay transmission is better than direct transmission when the relay locates in an oval-like area and the range of this area expands when the antenna gains of source and relay increase. Moreover, we find that the secrecy outage probability and average achievable secrecy rate also can be improved by using relay, and we can increase the transmission power to enhance the secrecy performance but the improvement is not infinite. 
C. PAPER ORGANIZATION
In Section II, we introduce the system model and mmWave channel characteristics. In Section III, considering the noncolluding eavesdroppers case, we investigate the secrecy performance of mmWave relaying networks. In Section IV, the secrecy performance in colluding eavesdroppers case is characterized. Then, we present the simulation results in Section V. Finally, the concluding remarks are provided in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Considering a secure communication in the mmWave relaying networks, as depicted in Fig. 1 , where a source node (S) transmits the confidential information to a destination node (D) in the presence of multiple spatially random eavesdroppers. D can associate with S directly or through a relay node (R). For relay transmission, the communication utilizes two slot times. In the first time slot, S transmits the messages to R, while in the second time slot, the relay transmits the re-encoded signals to D. RF relay is used in our model. RF means that S and R adopt different codebooks, which implies that the transmitted signal from S and R are not jointly processed at each eavesdropper [20] , [21] . In addition, we consider that the eavesdroppers have some mobility [24] , [25] . In relay transmission, when communication state changes from one time slot to another, the signal intensities received by eavesdroppers change dramatically. Then, the eavesdroppers move and constitute a new distribution. The location sets of the eavesdroppers are modeled as independent homogeneous PPPs E,i (i ∈ S, R) with the same density λ e , where S and R denote that eavesdroppers wiretapped from S and R, respectively.
A. DIRECTIONAL BEAMFORMING
Due to the short wavelength of mmWave, directional beamforming can be exploited to compensate the significant path-loss. Accordingly, we assume that all nodes equip with directional antennas in this model. Then, a sectored model in [26] is used to analyze the beam pattern. In particular,
where θ j is the beamwidth of the main lobe, G M j and G m j denote the array gains of main and side lobes, and j ∈ {S, R, D}.
In the training phase, the legitimate nodes can align to each other due to enough pilot symbol exchanges. The eavesdroppers may misalign S or R due to the scarce training information [14] , [16] , [27] . Then, the array gains of eavesdropping links are given as
where Pr lk (l, k ∈ {m, M }) denotes the probability that the antenna gain
B. BLOCKAGE MODEL
It's necessary to consider the effect of blockage in mmWave networks and the blockage model in [28] is adopted. We consider a two state statistical model for each link. The link is line-of-sight (LOS) when there is a direct transmission path between the transmitter and receiver. Accordingly, a link is non-line-of-sight (NLOS) when the link is blocked. The blockages follow an independent Poisson point process with density λ b . Let the link be of length d, then the probabilities of occurrence P L (·) and P N (·) of LOS and NLOS states respectively are given as
β is a parameter determined by the blockages' density and size 
C. PATH-LOSS MODEL
Similar to [29] , the path-loss laws applied to LOS and NLOS links are different. Given a link with length d, its path-loss can be calculated by
where α L and α N are the LOS and NLOS path-loss exponent,
10 are the intercepts of the LOS and NLOS path-loss functions. The path-loss parameters α j and C j (j ∈ {L, N }) are determined by the wave length of carrier wave. Some typical values are recorded in [29] . For instance, for 28GHz bands, α L = 2, ζ L = 61.4 and α N = 2.92, ζ N = 72.
D. SMALL-SCALE FADING
Nakagami-m distribution has been regarded as a general formula of intensity distribution of rapid fading, and it's used for describing the statistical distributions which model the random fluctuations of the signals amplitude when transmitted through a wireless channel, including millimeter wave channel [1] , [9] , [13] , [27] . We assume that the small-scale fading of each link follows independent Nakagami fading, and we use N L (N N ) to represent the fading parameter of the LOS (NLOS) link. 
E. FORMULATION OF RECEIVED SNRS
In our model, there are only S and R transmitting signals, and the propagating processes of S → R and R → D links occur in different time slots for relay transmission. Hence, the interference between two communicating nodes can be ignored. The received signal to noise ratio (SNR) at a legitimate receiver is given as
where P t is the transmit power of S and R, d ij is the distance between two legitimate nodes, N 0 is the noise power which can be calculated with N 0 = 10
. N 0 (dBm) = −174 + 10lg(BW ) + F dB , where n 0 (dBm) is the noise power spectral density, BW is the transmission bandwidth and F dB is the noise figure [13] .
We consider two types of eavesdroppers in this paper: non-colluding eavesdroppers and colluding eavesdroppers. For non-colluding eavesdroppers, all eavesdroppers cannot exchange information with each other. The secrecy performance is determined with the strongest signal wiretapped from the legitimate node. Then, the SNR at the most harmful eavesdropper is given as
where d iE e is the distance between the S (R) and the eavesdropper e ∈ E,S E,R .
In colluding eavesdroppers scenario, all eavesdroppers can exchange and combine the information. Thus, the sum of SNRs seen from all eavesdroppers dominates the secrecy performance, which is described as
In this paper, we dedicate to investigate the secure transmission of mmWave relaying networks, and examine that whether the secrecy performance of relay transmission is better than direct transmission. To facilitate the analysis, we use the Cartesian coordinate system which origin locates at the midpoint between S and D. Thus, S and D locate at (d SD /2, 0) and (−d SD /2, 0), respectively. In a Cartesian coordinate system, for a relay at (x, y), we can give that:
III. SECRECY PERFORMANCE FOR NON-COLLUDING EAVESDROPPERS
In this section, assuming that the eavesdroppers are noncolluding, we study the secure connectivity probability, secrecy outage probability and average achievable secrecy rate in mmWave relaying networks.
A. SECURE CONNECTIVITY PROBABILITY
We first study the secure connectivity probability of the mmWave relaying networks in non-colluding eavesdroppers case. From the perspective of connectivity, a secure connection is achievable if the secrecy rate is positive [20] . For relay transmission, the message is secure only if both the S → R link and R → D link are secure, so we can obtain the secure connectivity probability as
where step (a) is due to the fact that the secure connectivity probabilities of S → R link and R → D link are independent. The reason is that the eavesdroppers cannot combine the signals received from S and RF relay [30] , and the spatial distributions of eavesdroppers are independent in different time slots for relay transmission due to their mobility. For S → R link, the expression of secure connectivity probability is derived as follows
The formula
S is a point process mapped from E,S , where e denotes the locations of the eavesdroppers. Note that N e is only affected by smallscale fading and spatial distribution of eavesdroppers which follows a PPP. According to the displacement theorem [31] , N e is a PPP on R + . Then, (10) can be calculated as Pr min
where step (b) follows the PPP's void probability [31] , and
is the intensity measure of N e given as
where
E is the set of antenna array gains between S and the eavesdroppers, Pr(G SE = V ) can be obtained by (2), 1 (t) and 2 (t) are given by (13) and (14), respectively.
where Q denotes the radius of distribution plane.
Proof: See Appendix A. Furthermore, in order to make (11) easy to analyze, we also derive the closed-form approximate expression as
, T is the number of accumulation times, step (c) is due to the probability distribution function of gamma distribution approaches zero when its value exceeds multiple times of the mean value, we set the upper limit as 10 times of the mean value here, step (d) is due to the Gauss Chebyshev quadrature relationship [32] . The simulation results show that the error of the approximate expression can be ignored when T is large, which is about 30 in our simulation.
For R → D link, the derivation of secure connectivity probability is similar to S → R link. Then, the secure connectivity probability of relay transmission is given as
where k ∈ {S, R} and j ∈ {L, N }, R_E (0, t) is similar to S_E (0, t) but replacing G SE with G RE , which is given as (2) in Section II-A.
In order to compare the secrecy performance of relay transmission versus direct transmission, we derive the secure connectivity probability for direct transmission τ ne_dt as (18) , and then we analyze the inequation τ ne_rt > τ ne_dt written as (19) , shown at the top of next page.
Remark 1: According to (16) , the secure connectivity probability for relay transmission is only related to the distances and array gains of S → R and R → D links when the traffic environment and carrier frequency are certain. For given antenna gains, it's only determined with the location of relay. From (19), we can obtain an area of relay's location
where the secure connectivity probability of relay transmission is better than direct transmission. The area is similar to an oval, and when the antenna gains of S and R increase, the range of this area expands.
B. SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY
In this subsection, we study the secrecy outage probability of the mmWave relaying networks in the presence of multiple non-colluding eavesdroppers. In this paper, secrecy outage probability is defined as the probability that the secrecy rate is below a secrecy threshold C th [33] , [34] . For relay transmission, the outage occurs when S → R or R → D link is broken. So we can obtain the secrecy outage probability as
where 1 is derived as (21) , shown at the top of next page,
, T is the number of accumulation times, step(e) follows the PPP's void probability similar to (11), and step (f ) is due to the Gauss Chebyshev quadrature relationship. 2 can be calculated as (22) , shown at the top of next page, and the derivation is similar to 1 . Thus, the secrecy outage probability for relay transmission can be obtained by substituting (21) and (22) into (20) .
For direct transmission, the secrecy outage probability can be evaluated as (23) , shown at the top of next page. The derivation is similar to S → R link in relay transmission but the transmit-receive pair becomes S → D.
Remark 2: The intensity measures S_E (0, t) and R_E (0, t) are increasing functions versus t. Then, the secrecy outage probability decreases when transmitted power, antenna gain increase or the length of link decreases. Furthermore, we can find that the secrecy outage probability tends to be stable when transmitted power is large enough, which means that the improvement of secrecy outage probability is not infinite by increasing transmitted power.
C. AVERAGE ACHIEVABLE SECRECY RATE
In the following, we study the average achievable secrecy rate of the mmWave relaying networks in non-colluding eavesdroppers case. As shown in [14] , [16] , and [35] - [37] , the average achievable secrecy rate can be given asR s = R −R e + , where [x] + = max {x, 0},R andR e are the average capacities of the legitimate and the wiretapped channel, respectively. Then, we can obtain the average achievable secrecy rate for mmWave relaying networks in non-colluding eavesdroppers case asR
whereR rt andR ne_rt are the average capacities of the legitimate and wiretapped channel for relay transmission, respectively. 1 2 is because that the communication is divided into two slot times for relay transmission, which means that there are only half unit interval for S → R or R → D communication.
To calculate the average achievable secrecy rateR s_ne_rt , we first derive the average rate of legitimate linkR rt .
For RF relay strategy, S and R use different codebooks to transmit the confidential messages, and thus D cannot combine the signals received from S and R. Then, the average rateR rt can be evaluated as
where F K 1 (x) is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of K 1 , which is given as
To evaluate F K 1 (x), we first calculate Pr (γ SR > x) and Pr (γ RD > x).
Similarly, Pr (γ RD > x) can be calculated as
Substituting (27) and (28) into (26), we can obtain F K 1 , then we can obtain the average rate of legitimate linkR rt by substituting (26) into (25) .
Likewise, the average rate between the typical transmitting node and the most malicious eavesdropper is given as [38] 
where F K 2 (x) is the CDF of K 2 , which is derived as
where Pr γ S_ne < x can be derived as
where S_E (0, t) is given as (12) in Section III-A. Similarly, Pr γ R_ne < x is given as
where R_E (0, t) is similar to S_E (0, t) in Section III-A but replacing G SE with G RE . Then, we can calculate F K 2 by substituting (31) and (32) into (30), and we can obtain the average rate between the typical transmitting node and the most malicious eavesdropper R ne_rt by substituting (30) into (29) . Finally, we can obtain the average achievable secrecy rate for mmWave relaying networks in the presence of non-colluding eavesdropperR s_ne_rt by substituting (25) and (29) into (24) .
For direct transmission, the average achievable secrecy rate is derived asR
whereR dt andR ne_dt are derived as
The CDF of γ SD is calculated as
where the derivation is similar to S → R link in relay transmission but the transmit-receive pair becomes S → D.
The CDF of γ S_ne is evaluated as F γ S_ne (x) = Pr γ S_ne < x , which is given as (31) . Thus, we can obtain the average achievable secrecy rate for direct transmission R s_ne_dt , which can be written as
Remark 3: The average achievable secrecy rate increases when transmitted power increases, the reason is that the gap between the capacities of legitimate and eavesdropping channels increases when transmitted power increases due to the superior gain of legitimate channel. However, when transmitted power is large enough, the channel capacity is mainly determined with the transmitted power, and the gap between the capacities of legitimate and eavesdropping channels tends to be stable.
IV. SECRECY PERFORMANCE FOR COLLUDING EAVESDROPPERS
In this section, we study the secrecy performance in colluding eavesdroppers case, where geographically dispersed eavesdroppers combine the received signals from S or R to process the wiretapped secret information.
A. SECURE CONNECTIVITY PROBABILITY
Similar to the non-colluding eavesdroppers case, the secure connectivity probability for relay transmission is derived as
where For S → R link, we can derive the expression of secure connectivity probability as (39) , shown at the top of next page, where step (g) is due to [39, eq. (8. 
352.2)], step (h) is due to
Laplace transform property t n f (t)
the Laplace transform of random variable I S_E , which is given by (40) , shown at the top of next page.
Proof: See Appendix B. Although (39) is exact, it is rather intractable due to the higher derivatives. Therefore, we derive an approximate expression by using Alzer's lemma [1] . Let |h| 2 be a normalized gamma random variable with parameter N . , N }) . In Section V, we plot the Monte Carlo simulation points in the related figures, and we can see excellent agreement between the simulation points and the theoretical curves, which show that the error of the approximation is small.
For R → D link, the derivation is similar to S → R link. Then, we can obtain the secure connectivity probability of relay transmission as
Here
where i ∈ {S, R}, j ∈ {L, N } and L I R_E (s) is similar to L I S_E (s) but replacing G SE with G RE , which is given as (2) in Section II-A. For the purpose of analyzing the effect of relay in colluding eavesdroppers scenario, we derive the secure connectivity probability for direct transmission τ ce_dt as (45), and then we analyze the inequation τ ce_rt > τ ce_dt written as (42) , shown at the top of next page.
Remark 4: According to (43), for a given system, the secure connectivity probability of relay transmission is only determined with the relay's location. From (42), we can obtain an area of relay's location in which the secrecy performance of relay transmission is better than direct transmission. The area is similar to an oval, and its size increases when the antenna gains of S and R increase.
B. SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY
In the case of colluding eavesdroppers, the secrecy outage probability can be obtained as
where 1 is derived as (47), shown at the top of the next page, where the derivation of step (l) is similar to (41) . Likewise, 2 can be evaluate as (48), shown at the top of next page. Then, substituting (47) and (48) into (46), we can obtain the secrecy outage probability p sop_ce_rt .
For direct transmission, the secrecy outage probability is given as (49), shown at the top of next page. The derivation is similar to S → R link in relay transmission but the transmitreceive pair becomes S → D.
Remark 5: According to (47) and (48), for a given system, the secrecy outage probability is determined with transmitted power and secrecy threshold. We can find that the secrecy outage probability decreases when transmitted power increases. However, if the transmitted power is large enough, the exponent function including P t approaches constant value 1, which means that the secrecy outage probability tends to be stable. In addition, the secrecy outage probability increases versus increasing secrecy threshold.
C. AVERAGE ACHIEVABLE SECRECY RATE
Similar to the case of non-colluding eavesdroppers, the average achievable secrecy rateR s_ce_rt in the presence of
multiple colluding eavesdroppers is given as
where 1 2 is because that the communication is divided into two slot times for relay transmission, andR rt is given as (25) in Section III-C.
In colluding eavesdroppers case, the randomly distributed eavesdroppers can combine the signals received from S or R. Thus, the average rate for colluding eavesdroppers can be calculated as
where F K 3 (x) is the CDF of K 3 , which is derived as
To evaluate F K 3 (x), we first derive Pr γ S_ce < x and Pr γ R_ce < x .
where F I S_E (z) is the CDF of I S_E . In general, it is impossible to calculate its value directly. So, we use numerical inversion of Laplace transform to find F I S_E (z). The CDF of the random variable I S_E is related to the Laplace transform of
The integral can be discretized as a series and then we can truncate the infinite series as a finite sum via the Euler summation [40] . Since
Re {y} denotes the real part of y, and L I S_E (s) is given as (40) in Section IV-A. A, B and C are the parameters controling the estimation error. Following the mature guidelines in [40] and [41] , we can achieve an estimation accuracy of 10 −ς when A, B and C at least equal ς ln 10, 1.243ς − 1, and 1.467ς, respectively. We set A = 8 ln 10, B = 11 and C = 14, which achieves an estimation error of 10 −8 for the stable numerical inversion [42] . Thus, we can obtain Pr γ S_ce < x by substituting (54) into (53). Similarly, Pr γ R_ce < x can be calculated as
where F I R_E (x) is written as
where L I R_E (s) is similar to L I S_E (s) but replacing G SE with G RE , which is given as (2) in Section II-A. Finally, we can obtain the average achievable secrecy rate for mmWave relaying networks in the presence of colluding eavesdroppers by substituting (26) and (52) into (50).
For direct transmission, the average achievable secrecy rate can be derived as
whereR dt is given as (34) in Section III-C, andR ce_dt is derived asR
dx.
(58) VOLUME 7, 2019 The CDF of γ S_ce is calculated as F γ S_ce (x) = Pr(γ S_ce < x), which is given as (53). Thus, we can obtain the average achievable secrecy rate for direct transmissionR s_ce_rt , which can be written as (59), shown at the bottom of this page.
Remark 6: The channel capacity of legitimate link would not be influenced whether the eavesdroppers are noncolluding or colluding. Contrary to non-colluding case, the secrecy performance mainly determined with the channel capacity of eavesdropping links. The average achievable secrecy rate increases when transmitted power increases. However, the improvement is not infinity due to that the gap between the channel capacities of legitimate and eavesdropping links tends to stable when the transmitted power is large enough.
V. SIMULATION RESULT
In this section, we provide the simulation results to show the secrecy performance of the mmWave relaying networks. We assume that the mmWave communication networks operating at a carrier frequency 28GHz. The parameters used in our simulation are listed in Table 1 . We plot the Monte Carlo simulation points in each figure, and we can see excellent agreement between the simulation points and the theoretical curves, which validates our derivations. Fig. 2 shows the secure connectivity probability versus λ e , where DT means direct transmission, RT means relay transmission and (·, ·) denotes the coordinate of relay. We observe that: 1) For a given d SD , the secure connectivity probability decreases as the density of eavesdroppers λ e increases. This is because when λ e increases, the eavesdroppers have more chance to receive stronger signals.
2) The secure connectivity probability in non-colluding eavesdroppers case is better than colluding eavesdroppers case. The reason is that colluding eavesdroppers can obtain more information by exchanging and combining the received signals.
3) The secure connectivity probability of relay transmission is related to relay's position, and we can find that it can be superior to that of direct transmission for some relay's locations.
In Fig. 3 , we plot the secure connectivity probability as a function of d SD , where the density of eavesdroppers is λ e = 1 × 10 −3 . The results show that: 1) The secure connectivity probability decreases as d SD increases. This is because the channel capacity of legitimate link decreases as d SD increases, but the impact on eavesdroppers is slight because of the randomness of their locations.
2) The secure connectivitȳ probability in colluding eavesdroppers case is lower because colluding eavesdroppers can obtain more information.
3) Whether the secure connectivity probability of relay transmission is better than direct transmission is determined with the relative magnitudes of d SR , d RD and d SD . If the relay transmission is too far compared with direct transmission, the secure performance of direct transmission will be better than relay transmission. Fig. 4 plots the areas of the relay's position where the secure connectivity probability of relay transmission is better than direct transmission, are obtained from (19) and (42) . In order to observe the impact of antenna gain on secrecy performance, we change the antenna parameters as G M = 10dB, G m = −5dB, θ = 10 o and assume that all nodes equip the same antenna. Several observations can be drawn as follows: 1) The secure connectivity probability of relay transmission is better than direct transmission when the relay locates in an oval-like area. 2) When the antenna gains of R is larger than that of D, R can locate in the left area of D but still has better secure connectivity probability for relay transmission. The reason is that if the antenna gain of R is bigger than that of D, the S → R link can be longer than S → D link but still has better channel quality.
In Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 , we plot the secrecy outage probability versus C th and P t . To gain more insights, we compare the secrecy outage probability between direct and relay transmission. The simulation results show that: 1) The secrecy outage probability can be improved when the relay is closed to the midpoint between S and R. This reason is that we can obtain larger channel capacities for relay transmission when d SR and d RD are small. 2) For a given P t , the secrecy outage probability increases as C th increases. This is because when C th increases, it is more difficult to obtain enough channel redundance to meet the safety requirement. 3) For a constant C th , when P t increases, the secrecy outage probability decreases. And there are two floor in the process. The first floor is because that P t has different impacts on the secrecy outage probability of LOS and NLOS cases, and the second floor is due to the fact that when P t is large, the difference of SNR between the legitimate and wiretapped links tends to stable. 4) The secrecy outage probability of non-colluding eavesdroppers case is closed to colluding eavesdroppers case when P t is small. The reason is that the secrecy outage probability is mainly determined with the most malicious eavesdropper when P t is small. Fig. 7 plots the average achievable secrecy rate versus P t with different relay's locations. In order to compare the secrecy performance between relay and direct transmission, we also give the average achievable secrecy rate of direct transmission. Several observations can be drawn as follows: 1) For a constant λ e , the average achievable secrecy rate increases as the transmitted power P t increases. This is because that when P t increases, the gap of SNR between the legitimate receiver and eavesdropper increases due to the superior channel of legitimate link. But, when P t is large enough, the SNRs of all nodes are mainly dominated by P t , which means that the gap between the SNR of legitimate receiver and eavesdropper changes to be stable. 2) The average achievable secrecy rate in colluding eavesdroppers case is always worse than non-colluding eavesdroppers case. This is because that colluding eavesdroppers can obtain more information than non-colluding eavesdroppers.
3) The average achievable secrecy rate of relay transmission is related to the relay's location, and it can be better than direct transmission when R is closed to the midpoint between S and D.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, we have investigated the secure communication of mmWave relaying networks in the presence of multiple non-colluding and colluding eavesdroppers. The closed-form of secure connectivity probability, secrecy outage probability and the first order integral expressions of average achievable secrecy rate have been derived. The simulation results show the excellent agreement between the Monte Carlo simulation points and the theoretical curves, which verifies our derivations. Specially, our results show that the secure connectivity probability deteriorates as the density of eavesdroppers or the distance from S to D increases. Moreover, comparing the secrecy performance between direct and relay transmission, we find that the secrecy performance of mmWave networks can be improved by using relay and the secure connectivity probability of relay transmission is better than direct transmission when relay locates in an oval-like area, whose range expands when the antenna gain of S and R increase. In the future work, we will continue investigating the secure transmission in mmWave relaying networks by considering relay selection, smart eavesdropping and beamforming design.
APPENDIX A
The N e is a PPP on R + , and its intensity measure S_E (0, t) can given by
From the blockage model, E,S can be divided into two independent point process, the LOS and NLOS eavesdroppers processes. From the antenna model, we can know that the array gain of eavesdroppers in the main and side lobes are different. Thus, (60) can be derived as (61), shown at the top of next page, where Q is the radius of the distribution plane.
Use the CDF of gamma distribution, we can derive further 
where step (u) is due to the probability generating function of Poisson process.
In the following, we derive K as (65), shown at the top of this page, where T is the number of accumulation times and
Finally, substituting (65) into (64), we can obtain (40) .
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